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Main text (up to 800 words) 21 
Three recent studies have shown that nonhuman apes and macaques pass anticipatory-looking (AL) 22 
false-belief (FB) tests [1-3], inspired by seminal work with humans [e.g. 4]. These results raise the 23 
possibility that both apes and monkeys understand that others’ actions are driven not by reality but by 24 
beliefs about reality, even when those beliefs are false. In response, Horschler, MacLean, and Santos 25 
[5] argued that these findings ‘should be interpreted cautiously due to methodological and theoretical 26 
challenges paralleling trends in the human literature.’ We agree that continued work is necessary to 27 
identify factors that influence reproducibility of AL paradigms, and also to specify the mechanisms 28 
and functions of the observed behaviors in primates. However, inferences from the human literature 29 
(summarized in [5]) should be made with caution because key nonhuman results have largely been 30 
replicated and extended across different groups and species [1-3], so far providing a different picture 31 
from more variably replicable human studies. Moreover, nonhuman studies retain only the conceptual 32 
design of human paradigms with various improvements and optimization for nonhuman primates (Box 33 
1). What we see as the more pressing—but potentially interwoven—matter is resolving discrepancies 34 
among comparative findings: apes and monkeys have passed AL-FB tests (visually anticipating that 35 
an agent would search for an object where she falsely believed it to be) but monkeys have not 36 
succeeded in violation-of-expectation (VoE) FB paradigms [e.g. 6] (they do not look longer when an 37 
agent’s search is inconsistent with her FBs). Below, we spotlight crucial methodological differences 38 
that may explain the unique success of nonhuman AL paradigms. In concluding, we discuss adaptive 39 
significance and future directions. 40 
 Departing from most human AL paradigms and from nonhuman VoE studies, nonhuman AL 41 
tasks have embedded FB content within dynamic social interactions with intuitive action goals (e.g., 42 
agent seeks a competitor or contested object). Stimuli were crafted to motivate social primates to 43 
closely track agents’ interactions and understand agents’ goals. Agents’ approach or reaching actions 44 
were designed to appear natural and goal-directed, to evoke spontaneous anticipatory-looking to 45 
proximal action targets. Notably, in the absence of such dynamic social stimuli, apes do not reliably 46 
anticipate agents’ actions [7, 8] (but see diverse stimuli in [3]). Moreover, among the most replicable 47 
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human AL studies are those that promote understanding and action-anticipation through verbal story-48 
telling and anticipation-prompting questions [9]. We suggest that nonverbal equivalents, such as 49 
familiar stories and anticipation-prompting scene configurations (e.g. Tom-and-Jerry, Y-shaped tunnel; 50 
[10]) accomplish the same. Including these elements in nonhuman VoE studies may also improve 51 
performance. Working in free-ranging settings, nonhuman VoE studies have employed relatively 52 
simplistic live-acted events, but high rates of distraction may indicate shallower engagement with 53 
these stimuli. Although these paradigms have demonstrated standard true-belief (TB) phenomena, it 54 
is possible that only the most engaging and motivating stimuli can reveal primates’ (including 55 
humans’) full range of capacities.  56 
VoE and AL both offer powerful and complementary nonverbal methods for tapping, under 57 
minimal task demands, what we suspect are largely the same socio-cognitive phenomena. However, 58 
procedural differences also exist: whereas VoE uses general, reactive metrics (attention to displayed 59 
outcomes), AL uses specific, proactive ones (anticipatory gaze to action targets). AL tasks often 60 
remove the goal object before the agent seeks it, reducing cognitive demands while precluding a reality 61 
bias. Proactive/targeted looks and object removal also control for the possibility that participants 62 
expect random error or uncertainty from the agent by attributing ignorance rather than belief. 63 
Accordingly, AL uses two FB conditions to prompt distinct patterns of anticipation, akin to VoE TB-64 
FB designs (but note TB-FB comparisons: [2]). It remains an open question whether these procedural 65 
differences influenced nonhuman findings.   66 
 Importantly, AL but not VoE allows direct observation of online action anticipation, which 67 
hints at inherent functional advantage in social interaction. Relatedly, we think it unlikely that primates’ 68 
FB-related capacities are entirely implicit (lacking expression beyond eye-movements). Actionable 69 
FB understanding may have been obscured by the repeated use of a single context (food-competition) 70 
in previous ape studies [11], where FB-consistent performance could not be dissociated from 71 
knowledge-ignorance interpretations. Note that departure from that paradigm has provided evidence 72 
for such dissociation in an action-based task [12]. Critically, to date, researchers have been unable to 73 
test FB understanding in other fitness-relevant contexts (e.g., severe aggression, mating, infant 74 
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survival) because they are challenging to capture experimentally (although AL allows closer 75 
reproduction of some related contexts). Yet, it might be in those scenarios – confronting agents 76 
engaged in risky social interactions with important fitness consequences – that FB understanding is 77 
most reliably expressed. Future work must further explore action-based, VoE, and AL paradigms, the 78 
design and contextual factors that shape performance and replicability, and the mechanisms by which 79 
primates pass FB tests. Only with this combination of efforts—and careful experimental control of 80 
competing influences on behavior (including gaze)—will we be able to fully characterize the 81 
representations and processes that support primate social cognition. 82 
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Box 1. Methodological differences between nonhuman and human AL-FB studies  88 
Nonhuman AL-FB studies were optimized for nonhuman primates, and improved based on criticism 89 
of original human AL designs, by 1) counterbalancing the side in which key events occurred during 90 
familiarization and test [1-3]; 2) adopting multi-scenario/trial designs to stabilize within-individual 91 
response variation [1, 3] (note that comparing individual differences across studies is therefore more 92 
meaningful than doing so within studies); 3) using short movies involving dynamic social interactions 93 
[1-3] and a training procedure [3] to maintain attention and engagement; 4) using familiar props (e.g. 94 
haystack, metal mesh, stone, door) and intuitive scenarios to aid nonhuman participants’ understanding 95 
of characters’ actions and goals [1-3]; 5) presenting natural reaching and approach scenes that evoke 96 
anticipatory looking to proximal targets; and 6) using challenging conditions (e.g., FB2) with fewer 97 
low-level explanations in all tests [1-3]. It remains untested whether some of these changes could 98 
improve replicability in human AL-FB studies. Moreover, some parameters, such as optimal analysis 99 
windows of anticipatory looks (first looks and total looking duration), could be further evaluated in 100 
future human and nonhuman AL-FB tasks—although this should be optimized in each task, rather 101 
than simply standardized across tasks, because cognitive demands vary across tasks (e.g. [1, 2]).   102 
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